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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
South Africa has seen a dramatic decrease in household size over the last decade. In Table 1 we show that
over the eight-and-a-half years from October 1995 to March 2004 the average household size has decreased
by 20% or 0.74 persons (see also Pirouz 2004). Consequently for a ﬁx e dp o p u l a t i o ns i z et h e r ew o u l dh a v e
been 20% more households in March 2004 than in October 1995. Such a rapid rate of household formation
is interesting in and of itself. From the perspective of a policy maker it is particularly vital to understand
this process. The new democratic government has committed itself to extending infrastructure and social
services to households in deprived communities and now ﬁnds that it is trying to catch a moving target.
The backlogs are increasing as the services are being rolled out. We will suggest below that there might be
a connection between these two processes.
Reductions in household size have, of course, happened in many societies (see for example Kobrin 1976,
Burch and Matthews 1987, Burch 1995, Kuijsten 1995). Explanations for this trend have included changes
in purely “demographic” variables, such as fertility, mortality and age of childbearing (Burch 1970), changes
in “economic” variables, such as income and housing prices (Börsch-Supan 1986, Ermisch and Salvo 1997,
Haurin, Hendershott and Kim 1993) and changes in preferences and attitudes to “living alone”. Household
size therefore reﬂects many of the underlying social, economic and political processes at work in society.
The contribution of this paper is that we present a novel decomposition technique that allows us to track
how this change occurs. We compare the sizes of “surviving” households to those that go out of existence
and those newly created. We show that within our study area the main driver of the reduction in the average
household size has been a “dilution” eﬀect, where the rapid creation of new and smaller households brings
down the average. There is, however, also some evidence that the South African households in the area are
actively shedding members. Our technique requires an area wide panel in which we can track all three of
these developments. We are able to do this because we have demographic surveillance data from a site in
the eastern part of South Africa, near the border with Mozambique, the Agincourt subdistrict.
Our study is interesting in other ways. Our district has had a signiﬁcant subpopulation of Mozambican
refugees, that ﬂed at the height of the Mozambican civil war. We show that there seems to have been a
process of “assimilation” in which households have moved out of the original refugee villages and into the
South African ones. In the process larger households seem to have broken up and become reconstituted.
The net eﬀect of all these changes is that in the ten years from November 1993 to November 2003
household size has decreased by 0.6 persons in the district. We consider a number of possible explanations
for these trends. Among the purely “demographic” variables we note a marked reduction in fertility and
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1some evidence of increased mortality. These, however, cannot by themselves explain the very rapid rise in
household formation. Furthermore we argue with the aid of a simple “demographic” model of household
change that these processes are unlikely to explain the observed pattern in the reduction of household size.
Changes in preferences and attitudes may account for some of the changes. The death throes of apartheid
ended not only the system of racial discrimination, but also shook up many other established social relation-
ships. The Bushbuckridge area, within which our study site falls, saw intense conﬂict some of which took the
form of intergenerational disputes. Older people in general, and the “traditional” authorities of chiefs and
headmen saw their status and power within the community erode. In this context it may not be surprising
if some of the “traditional” ways of organising households may also be changing.
Economic changes have also been profound. Incomes have been negatively aﬀected by some of the deep-
seated restructuring of many of the sectors of the South African economy that occurred with the increasing
opening up of the South African economy to the outside world. In particular the mining sector shed hundreds
of thousands of workers over this period. Many of them came from the rural areas such as our study site.
Economic hardship should, ceteris paribus lead to an increase in household size, as the pressure to reduce
living costs and gain access to existing incomes leads to increased co-residence. This trend would be oﬀ-set
by the fact that access to land, housing and services arguably became markedly cheaper in the post-apartheid
era. Indeed this area was the recipient of a government housing scheme. We show that there may be some
“excess” household formation around the time that this scheme was created.
In general the patterns we observe suggest that access to land and housing became easier in the post-
apartheid era and this facilitated new household formation. However, in the end we do not have the economic
data to prove this conjecture or to adjudicate between the competing explanations. We make some sugges-
tions as to how additional work on the existing data set might make it an even more useful resource in
future.
The plan of this discussion is as follows. In the next section, we brieﬂy review some of the literature
on households and household size. Section 3 describes the data that we will be analysing. We turn to
a discussion of the broad trends observable in the data in section 4, and brieﬂy discuss several candidate
explanations. From these we move on to describe our decomposition technique (section 4.2). We then turn
to consider explanations of the change that refer purely to changes in mortality and fertility (section 5) We
calibrate how these changes might impact on our decomposition by means of a simple mathematical model
(in section 5.3) and conclude that these changes would not have led to the observed pattern of household size
reduction. In section 6 we look at some “economic” factors that might have led to the changes. In particular
we focus on the changes in access to land and housing. We show how the patterns of household change
diﬀer between diﬀerent subpopulations within the Agincourt area. In section 7 we consider how social and
political factors might have played a part. In the conclusion we
2 Theories of Households and household change
A focus on household size may seem to be curious, given that changes in household size can occur for
many diﬀerent reasons: births, deaths, in- and out-movement of adult children, parents or other individuals.
Each of these processes can and ought to be analysed in its own right. Household size as the outcome of the
interplay of all these forces is therefore a rather complex phenomenon. It may not even be a very well deﬁned
concept: membership in households may be very ﬂuid, with people being able to reduce their membership
of a given household along a continuum.
2.1 Deﬁnitions of the household
Of course we have assumed that there is a workable concept of the “household” which can be implemented
in the ﬁeld. At a practical level this issue has already been resolved, since our data is organised around
“households”, i.e. residential units within which there is a some form of resource sharing. These “households”
are not identical with “families”, although there are areas of overlap.
However, the theoretical importance of coresidence for social processes should not be assumed ap r i o r i .
It is feasible that nonresident individuals may be crucial for particular “household” decisions or that transfer
payments from such people may be instrumental in keeping the household economically aﬂoat. Indeed
2migrant workers are suﬃciently important within the Agincourt area, that they are included in the deﬁnition
of a household, even though they may be absent for signiﬁcant periods each year.
D e s p i t ea l lt h er e s e r v a t i o n st h a to n em a yh a v ea b o u tthe concept of the household, such entities seem to
be meaningful and recognizable to both researchers and the study population.
2.2 Demographic approaches
At a simple level, households are the locus within which the major demographic events occur: births, deaths
and individuals (adult children) leaving to set up independent households. Burch (1970) provides a simple
set of models which connect these with average household size. The precise connection depends on the family
system in place, i.e. whether it is the nuclear family or extended family or some other variant.
The treatment is based on a typical single-sex model (Keyﬁtz 1985, Section 1.2). In the nuclear family
version of the model, women all leave their home of origin at age N to become heads of household. It is
reasonably obvious that the average household size in the stable population will be P(total)/P(N and over),
so that average household size is a function of the age structure and the average age at which an independent
household is set up (marriage) (Burch 1970, p.63). There is no explicit discussion in this part of the model
what happens to women below age N whose mothers die. The simplest is to assume that these orphans get
fostered by women with identical age to the late mother.
This is in fact explicitly assumed in the extended family version of the model, where women only leave
their home on the death of the mother, provided that this occurs after age N.I nt h i sc a s ei ti sa s s u m e dt h a t
A is the average age of childbearing and that the gap between every woman and her mother is precisely A.
It follows that at age N +X the proportion of women still in their mother’s household will be
lA+N+X
lA+N ,w h e r e
l is the life-table function. The denominator is simply the pool of mothers that are still alive when their
daughters reach age N, while the numerator is the pool that is still alive X years later. The headship rates
therefore depend not only on the age structure and the age of marriage, but also the age at childbearing
and on mortality (Burch 1970, p.63). Burch’s simulations suggest that very few societies can operate a pure
form of the extended family system. The average household size predicted for such systems is much larger
than is found in practice (Burch 1970, p.65).
There are other connections between demographic processes and average household size. One of the
most dramatic contributors to the fall in the average household size in Western societies is the increase
in the number of older women who live alone. One mechanism that may be contributing towards this is
declining fertility and hence the declining availability of female relatives (in particular daughters) for the
aged (Kobrin 1976).
2.3 Economic approaches
While these demographic approaches tend to take household membership as a pure datum, the economic
approaches assume that membership of a household among adults is a matter of choice. This choice will be
inﬂuenced by the utility that members derive from being in that household, as well as the costs involved.
These are assumed to be compared to the other options that the individual might have.
These approaches to the household all trace their antecedents to the work of Becker (1991). Becker
assumed that even marriage could be analysed in these terms. Whether people marry or not, and the age
at which they do so, would be a reﬂection of the state of the “marriage market”, i.e. the characteristics (in
particular earnings potentials) of prospective spouses, as well as one’s own characteristics.
The process of household formation is therefore not simply an exogenous given. It responds to changes
in economic conditions. This has been shown in a number of empirical studies (Börsch-Supan 1986, Ermisch
and Salvo 1997, Haurin et al. 1993). In particular the process by which adult children leave the parental
home even prior to getting married, seems to be a function of the income of the parents as well as the costs
of setting up a separate household. Housing prices, in particular, seem to be an important determinant. The
economies of scale in consumption to be obtained from living together is another.
Implicit in these models is the idea that privacy is a normal good, at least among the Western households
studied, so that the parents of adult children would prefer these children to live somewhere else. It is
assumed that typically the adult children would also prefer to be out of the parents’ household, provided
3that they can aﬀord this. This might require subsidies or transfers from the parental household (Rosenzweig
and Wolpin 1993), which is why there is an income gradient associated with separate living among younger
adults.
The assumption of consensus within the household about how to organise itself or how to spend its
income, is typical in Beckerian household models. Indeed it is generally assumed that there is a common
household preference function which is optimised. This assumption has come under scrutiny in more recent
accounts (McElroy and Horney 1981, Manser and Brown 1980, Chiappori 1988, Lundberg and Pollak 1994,
Bergstrom 1997). In particular Chiappori (1988) argues that the analysis of household spending should focus
on the implicit “sharing rule” which determines who has what say over which component of the household
budget. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) suggest that coresidence is not irrelevant to that sharing rule. It
is easier to lay claim to certain services if one is under one roof with someone who can sponsor the cost of
those services.
2.4 Sociological approaches
Of course there are norms which determine who one may coreside with and who one should not. These
norms are quite diﬀerent in Western societies, where the nuclear household is held up to be the ideal, and in
the patrilineal societies characterising many parts of Africa. Russell (2003a) has investigated the extent to
which the set of beliefs underpinning the “traditional” extended households of African rural areas are still
intact and to what extent these are being transformed to something approximatingt h e“ W e s t e r n ”a t t i t u d e s
to households. She ﬁnds that even in “rural” areas there is not unanimity on what constitutes appropriate
behaviour in relation to kin. Urban blacks show attitudes which are an amalgam of those characterising
rural blacks and urban whites. It is clear, therefore, that the values are in the process of changing.
Interestingly enough, she ﬁnds little correlation between the values expressed in her survey and the
actual living arrangements of the respondents. Nevertheless to the extent to which the articulated values
are a reﬂection of what people aspire to, it seems clear that living arrangements are in transition.
Nevertheless she argues that they are not changing to the nuclear type. Indeed the nuclear family is
coming under pressure in advanced capitalist societies itself. Russell argues that the new forms of living
arrangements arising in South Africa show many continuities with the older systems:
There is a reaﬃrmation of dispersed responsibilities amongs scattered kin, to be seen in the
fostering of children, the constant transfer of earnings to dependants, the shuttling of packed
buses between town and country (2003a, p.172)
The lesson that she draws from this is that the “household” is unlikely to be the only or even the
most meaningful unit of social analysis. Instead, the household is embedded in a set of wider relationships.
Membership of the household is a much more ﬂuid concept than our databases would suggest.
This is an important point to bear in mind when interpreting the data reported below. Nevertheless it is
likely that coresidence is more salient than Russell would suggest. There is ample evidence to suggest that
when coresidence ceases, the resource ﬂows become much less secure.
3 The Agincourt demographic data
The Agincourt Health and Population Unit was established in 1992 with the aim of addressing issues around
the decentralisation of health services and to provide accurate information for planning (Tollman 1999,
Tollman, Herbst, Garenne, Gear and Kahn 1999). The strategy was to conduct health and demographic
surveillance, underpinning a programme of inter-disciplinary health and population research.
Agincourt was selected in part because it reﬂects many of the key developmental challenges. The area
lacks a functioning vital registration system, thus making on-going demographic surveillance appropriate.
Furthermore, the area formed part of the previous Gazankulu homeland and therefore exhibits many of
the characteristics of these areas: a lack of infrastructure and a population that has been subject to forced
removals and betterment planning (for a discussion of some of these processes see Niehaus 2001).
Agincourt is a sub-district of the Bushbuckridge region of the Limpopo Province (see Figure 1). The site
is particularly interesting, since it is close to the Mozambique border and has a signiﬁcant subpopulation of
4Mozambican refugees. These refugees arrived in the late 1980s during Mozambique’s civil war. They come
from the same language group as the South Africans, but they form a distinct subpopulation. Indeed, many
of them live in villages which consist predominantly of refugees.
3.1 The Demographic and Health Surveillance System
The Agincourt Demographic and Health Surveillance System monitors key demographic events and socio-
economic variables in the Agincourt sub-district. A baseline census was conducted in 1992 and since then
there have been seven census rounds in nine years. The main demographic, health and socio-economic vari-
ables measured routinely by the DSS include: births, deaths, in- and out-migrations, household relationships,
resident status, refugee status, education, antenatal and delivery health-seeking practices (Tollman 1999, Toll-
man et al. 1999, Collinson et al. 2002). Circular migrants are accounted for by including on the household
roster non-resident members who retain signiﬁcant contact and links with the rural home (Collinson, Tollman,
Garenne and Kahn 2001). The “Share common pot” deﬁnition of a household is thus expanded to include
the temporary migrants who would normally share the same pot on return. The deﬁnition of household head
is the main household decision maker, as reported by the household respondent.
In the update rounds a trained lay ﬁeldworker interviews the most competent respondent available at
the time of visit. Individual information is checked for every household member. All events are recorded
that have occurred since the previous census. Where possible questions are directed to particular household
members, for example maternity history or pregnancy outcome information is asked directly from the woman
involved, and a verbal autopsy is conducted with the person most closely involved with the deceased during
the terminal illness. Revisits are undertaken when appropriate respondents are not available. Data quality
checks include duplicate visits on 2% of households. In addition a number of validation checks are built
into the ﬁeldwork and data-entry programme. The software system used consists of a relational database
constructed in Microsoft SQL Server.
3.2 Tracking households over time
In the DSS system each household had an identiﬁed head. This person also served a reference function for
recording relationship information. The variable, relationship to the head of household was updated annually
since 1996 for nearly all members of the population. If a head of household died or out-migrated a new set
of references was constructed at the census following the change of household head.
A panel dataset was constructed for this analysis, using DSS data. The data, including household
membership, were divided into one year intervals for the prospective period, viz. 1993 - 2003. For the study
we took a household to be a dissolved if all household members moved out and started as new members
moved in. If there was any overlap in membership between successive households we kept the same household
identiﬁer.
A limitation of this dataset is that over the observation period the DSS did not have the capacity to
retain a person’s DSS identity number if he or she moved within the study site.
4 Changes in household size in Agincourt
In Figure 2 we present various ways of looking at population changes in the Agincourt sub-district over
the period 1992—2003. The top panel gives the birth rate, death rate and in-migration and out-migration
rates. We note that the latter two ﬁgures have to be treated with some caution, since movements within the
Agincourt study site were not tracked. Every such move should be recorded twice on the DSS data base:
as an outmigration and as an inmigration. We observe that the birth rate is decreasing, while there is a
noticeable increase in the death rate from 1998.
The middle panel of Figure 2 shows that the net population growth rate is around 0.8% per annum. This
is, however, markedly lower than the growth rate in the number of households which averages around 1.7%
per annum. The lowest panel shows that the turnover at the level of households is much higher than this net
increase would suggest. Household formation rates seem to be around 5% while household dissolution rates
are around 3.6%. As in the case of individuals, some of these dissolution and formation events will be entire
5households that relocate within the study site. Indeed we will suggest later that such internal moves are
quite important and that they may provide the opportunity for some households to restructure themselves.
4.1 Methodologies for describing the changes
The fact that the rate of household formation is higher than the population growth rate implies, of course,
that the distribution of household sizes within the population must be changing too. In order to get some
insight into the relationship between population growth, shifts in the distribution of household types and
the decline of average household size, we initially use a set of measures described by Kuijsten (1995). The
demographic eﬀect gives the ratio between the actual change in the number of households and the change







where Ht is the number of households at time period t and r
p
t,t+1 is the rate of population growth between
t and t +1(Kuijsten 1995, p.68).
Applying this formula to the change between 1992 and 2003, we ﬁnd a demographic eﬀect of 47 for
Agincourt (see Table 2). This means that only about 47% of the growth in the number of households
between 1992 and 2003 can be explained as due to pure population growth.
Interestingly this ﬁgure is below the demographic eﬀect for some European countries calculated for the
1960s, but above those for the 1970s. This may suggest that we are seeing aspects of the “third demographic
transition” described by Kuijsten, but here in a underdeveloped third world setting. Further results reported
below will show that this is not yet the case.
We observe in Table 2 that the year-on-year demographic eﬀect ﬂuctuates quite markedly. This is due in
part to the much smaller changes in household numbers between censuses leading to small divisors and hence
more unstable estimates. There are, however, clearly much more substantial problems with the underlying
data in the ﬁrst and the last period. In essence population changes were more marked than changes in the
number of households in these periods. These are probably artefacts of the data. It is likely that not everyone
was captured in the ﬁrst round of the census. Individuals that were recorded later might have swelled the
population counts, while it would have been much harder to miss entire households in that ﬁrst round. As
far as the 2003 data is concerned, it is possible that some people might have been mistakenly classiﬁed as
migrating out, while subsequent censuses may discover that they are still within the area.
The 53% part of the change in household numbers that remains unexplained must arise due to changes
in the distribution of household sizes. Kuijsten (1995) suggests that we can explore these changes by means












where Hi,t is the number of households at time period t in size class i. The numerator expresses the diﬀerence
between the actual change in the number of households in size class i and the hypothetical change if the
population growth had occurred in such a way that the distribution of household sizes had stayed ﬁxed. A
size class with a positive structure eﬀect has more households in it than would be expected as being due to
population increase. This would represent a shift in the distribution towards that size class.
As Table 3 shows, the pattern of change in Agincourt has been away from households with ten or more
people in them and towards households with ﬁve or fewer individuals. The intermediate cases (six to nine
individuals) have kept more or less abreast with population increase. The shifts in the size distribution do
not as yet indicate a move towards the dominance of extremely small households which Kuijsten takes as
the deﬁning feature of the “third demographic transition”.
4.2 Decomposition of the changes
There are several ways in which the reduction in household size might arise. It could be that the large
households are supplying disproportionately many outmigrants or deaths, i.e. that large households are
6moving “down” the size distribution. Perhaps due to socio-economic changes, the largest households are
being reconstituted, e.g. family groups leaving extended family settings and forming new households. It
could also be that larger households simply cease to exist (e.g. due to outmigration) and that the new
households that are formed are relatively small. Finally it is possible that if there are many more newly
formed households than households going out of existence, and if these are smaller, then the larger proportion
of new small households compared to old established ones will bring about a reduction in the overall average.
Given that we have panel data and not just a series of cross-sections, we can look inside households
and see how these diﬀerent mechanisms play themselves out. More particularly we propose an arithmetic
decomposition of the change of household size into diﬀerent eﬀects.
Let yt be the average household size in year t, yS
t be the average size among households surviving to year
t+1, yT
t be the average among households terminating in year t and yN
t+1 be the average among households
newly formed in year t +1 .T h e nw eh a v e
yt =( 1 − θ)yT
t + θyS
t
yt+1 =( 1 − φ)yN
t+1 + φyS
t+1
where θ is the proportion of households surviving to period t +1in the population at time t and φ is the
proportion of survivors from period t at t +1 .S o
∆yt+1 = θ∆yS













This decomposition is not unique. We could as easily have written
∆yt+1 = φ∆yS













Unless there is a very rapid increase or decline in the number of households θ−φ should be close to zero and
the two decompositions should give similar results. In the empirical results we report the ﬁrst decomposition.
The second provides qualitatively similar results and is available on request from the authors.
We term the three eﬀects
• The within household change eﬀect θ∆yS
t+1






,s i n c et h ed i ﬀerence yN
t+1 −yT
t represents the eﬀects of new
households replacing ones going out of existence






,s i n c eθ − φ is non-zero only if there is a net change in the
number of households and the term yN
t+1 − yS
t+1 reﬂects how newly formed households diﬀer from
surviving ones. In a period of rapid household formation, the existing (surviving) households become
a decreasing fraction of the entire population of households. Their contribution to the overall mean
household size therefore becomes diluted by the new households.
The decomposition of the change in household size for Agincourt is given in Table 4. The total change
∆yt+1 i sg i v e ni nt h eﬁrst column. Columns two and three give ∆yS
t+1and yN
t+1 −yT
t respectively. In column
four we give yN
t+1 − yS
t+1. Tthe decomposition is given in the next three columns. At the bottom we have
summed the contributions over the period 1993 to 2003. The biggest contribution to the change in household
size comes from the “dilution” eﬀect. Over 70% of the overall reduction can be ascribed to it. Indeed looking
at the entries in the table, it is clear that the newly formed households are on average smaller by 2.7 people.
It is the mushrooming of many new, smaller households rather than a reduction in the size of the existing
households that has led to the overall reduction in household size.
5 Demographic Explanations of the change
It is clear from the discussion of the “demographic” eﬀect above that purely demographic changes will not
be able to account for the rapid rate of household formation. Nevertheless it is useful to put the overall
discussion into the context of the dramatic demographic changes that have occurred within the Agincourt
area. In order to anchor this discussion further, we also present a very simple model of household change akin
to the Burch (1970) model. This model allows us to compare the actual decompositions that we obtained in
Table 4 to the sort of changes that we might have expected from dropping fertility or increasing mortality.
75.1 Decrease in the fertility rate
One of the patterns observed in data gathered from the Agincourt data site is a very marked drop in
fertility during the 1990s. Indeed Figure 2 shows a declining birth rate over the period under discussion.
Garenne, Tollman and Kahn (2000) reconstructed maternity histories and put this together with demographic
surveillance data collected since 1992. They calculated that up to the late 1980s total fertility was stable
at around 5.5 children per woman. This has since rapidly declined to the current levels, which are around
2.8. We can see the impact on the age structure quite graphically in Figure 3, where we compare the age
distributions in 1993 and in 2003 for South African citizens and non-South African citizens.
Several features are evident in the graphs. We can see in both subpopulations the impact of the fertility
transition by 2003. The proportion of young children has come down markedly, leaving a “dent” in the age
pyramid. This fertility transition is much more advanced in the South African subpopulation than in the
Mozambican one, however. It is also noticeable that the Mozambican age pyramids show a much younger
proﬁle than the South African ones overall, suggesting historically higher fertility levels.
There is a marked excess in the number of women. This may be due not only to higher mortality among
males, but also to higher migration rates.
5.2 Increase in mortality and outmigration
Figure 2 has already alerted us to what appears to be an increase in the mortality rate. Work on the verbal
autopsies conﬁrms that there has been an increase in mortality associated with the AIDS pandemic. Indeed,
in Agincourt the data shows the double negative of increased chronic disease mortality, accompanied by the
ongoing and worsening infectious diseases associated with underdevelopment (Kahn, Tollman, Garenne and
Gear 1999, Kahn and Tollman 1999, Garenne, Kahn, Tollman and Gear 2000).
An increase in the outmigration rate of prime-age individuals could have an impact not dissimilar from an
increase in mortality, particularly if children do not move with them. The reduced availability of potential
care givers might have an impact on the living arrangements of the elderly (Kobrin 1976). If there are
young dependents that stay behind, they would need to be cared for. Of course migration might provide the
economic basis for sustaining particular households also.
An interesting summary picture of the net impact of mortality and outmigration is presented in Figure
4. We have looked at the percentage change in the size of a 1993 age cohort over the ten year period 1993
to 2003. We have expressed these as the percentage reductions in the size of the age cohort, though with
inmigration there could in theory have been gains. To interpret the graphs, the ﬁgures show, for instance
that there were no survivors from the cohort of ninety year males in 1993 in 2003. By contrast, the size of
the cohort of 100 year old women in 2003 was 40% of the size of the cohort of ninety year old women in
1993.
It is particularly interesting to note the diﬀerent patterns of cohort change in the two subpopulations.
In the Mozambican subpopulation there is a steady attrition across the board in every age cohort. In the
case of the South Africans there is a very noticeable “bulge” in cohort attrition in individuals that were in
their twenties and early thirties in 1993. Some of this is undoubtedly due to AIDS. Some of it may also be
due to outmigration.
5.3 A simple model of household change
It is useful to calibrate how fertility changes and mortality might impact on the decomposition presented in
section 4.2. We therefore turn now to formulating an extremely simple demographic model.
5.3.1 The baseline model: nuclear households with all mortality in old age
The model that we propose is a simple single sex overlapping generations model. The women in our model
live through four periods: they start as children C, become young adults FY , then become mature women
FM at which stage they have children themselves and ﬁnally they become old FO. Initially we assume that
all women survive until they are old, at which stage they die. We relax this assumption below.
8We assume that each woman has f surviving children and that they live in nuclear households. A
schematic representation of this is given in Figure 5, panel (a), where time starts at the bottom and increases
moving up the page. Households that remain in existence from one period to the next are joined by solid
lines. Dotted lines indicate individuals who leave a household to set up new households.
Several things are evident. Firstly, each household over its life-cycle gains as many members (children) as
it eventually sheds. This might suggest that the “within household change” eﬀect is zero. This is, however,
not the case for the simple reason that there are more young households who gain members than mature












so that if there are nM mature women, there will be
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fnM households which gain f members and nm
































The ﬁrst point to note is that if f>1, we would expect the within household change eﬀect to be positive,
even if there is no change in the average household size - and the bigger f is, the more positive this eﬀect
will be.
Secondly, we can calibrate this against the actual Agincourt data using an empirical estimate of f.T h e
Agincourt total fertility rate is about 2.8 (Garenne, Tollman and Kahn 2000) so that f =1 .4.I fw ea s s u m e
that the average child-bearing age is thirty, so that the gap between the periods in our model is roughly
ﬁf t e e ny e a r s ,t h e nw eﬁnd that in this model the expected within household eﬀect over the ten year period
1993-2003 should be of the order of 0.056.I nf a c ti ti s0.018 (Table 4) which is one third the size.
Since in a stable population there is no change in average household size, this positive within household
change eﬀect must be balanced by a negative eﬀect somewhere else. In our model it is trivially true that the
replacement eﬀect is zero. It is evident that the dilution eﬀect must be negative.
We can see quite quickly why this has to be the case. In a growing population θ −φ must be positive. It









f+1 which is positive whenever f>1. yN
t+1
is by our assumptions equal to one and yS
t+1 is an average of mature households (with population f +1)a n d





While in a stable population this eﬀect should be the negative of the within household eﬀect, i.e. around
−0.056, in fact in Table 4 it is around −0.42, which is almost an order of magnitude larger. Furthermore
we also ﬁnd a negative replacement eﬀect of −0.19. This divergence should not be surprising given that our
data do not come from a stable population.
5.3.2 Changes in the fertility rate
What impact would changes in the fertility rate have on household size and on our decomposition? It is
clear that average household size must come down. If the new total fertility rate is a fraction a<1 of the













In the period immediately after the drop in the fertility rate, the average change within households
will drop, since the growing households are adding fewer members than the shrinking ones are shedding.
1One awkward feature of such a model is that it does not intrinsically produce a stable population, since the associated
transition matrix is not primitive (Keyﬁtz 1985, pp.31—33). This problem, however, applies to any model which has a ﬁxed age
of child-bearing, including the one by Burch (1970) cited earlier. We will simply introduce stability exogenously and trust that
the key insights will hold up in a more complicated model.
2Noting again that there is no mechanism internal to the model to establish stability.
9Nevertheless since there are still more of the former (given that the cohort of child-bearing women was born
in an era of positive population growth) the within household change eﬀect may still be positive. Indeed in
our simple model it would be, provided that af >
√
f. In this period the “dilution” eﬀect would be stronger,
since the newly formed households will tend to be even smaller than the existing ones.
The within household change eﬀect will stay smaller than it would be in the stable population up to
the point when the last cohort that was born under the higher birth rate regime moves out of the system.
When these households are in the “shedding” phase, there will be more of them than there should be, in
equilibrium.
In the Agincourt context the change in fertility has happened fairly recently and we would still be in the
regime where child-bearing women were born in an era of higher population growth, so we would expect the
“within” household growth eﬀect to be larger than it seems to be.
5.3.3 The impact of mortality
The simplest way to introduce deaths among younger women is to assume (as Burch’s model does) that
children in households where the mother dies get assigned to a foster mother. We will assume, speciﬁcally,
that young women that die do so after they have given birth. A schematic representation is given in Figure
5, panel (b). In that ﬁgure we have illustrated two deaths: one by a young woman and one by a mature
woman. In the case of the latter there are no fostering implications, since the children were almost ready to
l e a v eh o m ea n y w a y .
Deaths impact on household size in a number of ways. Firstly, households with foster children are
obviously larger. This means that such households gain more members at an early stage and then lose more
members later. Secondly, the “replacement” eﬀect will change, since there are now bigger households that
dissolve. Thirdly, some episodes of “shedding” of members will now not be recorded as a change in size of
an existing household, but as the dissolution of that household.
We can investigate these impacts formally. Let nqy be the probability of a young woman dying before
she reaches the next period, i.e. maturity, and nqm be the probability of a mature woman dying before she
reaches old age. With this slight abuse of notation we are implicitly assuming that each period corresponds
to n years. Then assuming that foster children are evenly spread around, the average surviving mature
woman will have not only f oﬀspring but also
nqy
1−nqyf foster children, i.e.
f
1−nqy dependents.
I fa tt h et i m ep e r i o dt =0we have h0 young women, then at t =1we will have (1 −n qy)h0 “mature”
households and at t =2there will be (1 −n qy)(1−n qm)h0 “old” ones. Imposing stability again we can
show that at t =2there will be (1 −n qy)
√
fh0 mature women and fh0 young women. Putting all this





























The eﬀect of mortality is therefore unambiguously to increase ∆yS
t . The reason for this is twofold: surviving
households have to absorb the orphans, tending to increase household size. As before this is oﬀset when
these children leave the household on growing up, but as long as there are more children coming into existing
households than adult foster children leaving them, the net eﬀect will be positive. Secondly, some mature
households are shattered by the deaths of the head of the household meaning that we do not observe some
of these households at the “shedding” stage, so increasing the size of the within household change eﬀect.
This is oﬀset to some extent by the fact that the proportion of surviving households is smaller than would






f(1−nqy)+(1−nqy)(1−nqm).W ec a ns h o w











f (1 −n qy)+( 1−n qy)(1−n qm)
(4)
10which is unambiguosly larger than was the case shown in equation 3.
Since in the stable population there is no net change in household size, this is oﬀset by a negative
“replacement” eﬀect and a negative growth eﬀect. The replacement eﬀect will obviously be negative, since
the newly formed households will all be of size one, whereas the size among households dissolving will be
a weighted average of one (the old and young households) and households of size
f
1−nqy +1(mature ones).
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f (1 −n qy)+( 1−n qy)(1−n qm)
(5)
It is clear that in this model the size of the replacement eﬀect depends crucially on the death rate of
mature women, i.e. women that are taking care of children. This makes sense. It is the dissolution of larger
households that is mainly captured in the replacement eﬀect. The death rate of young women has an indirect
eﬀect: by reducing the number of households it increases the average size of the “mature” households, so
that if one of those gets dissolved it has a bigger impact.
















f (1 −n qy)+( 1−n qy)(1−n qm)
(6)
It is clear that the death rate impacts on this only through the number of households in the population, i.e.
the denominator.
To put all this into context, let us assume that we are taking snapshots of our population so that the age
corresponding to C is 5, to FY is 20, FM is 35 and FO is 50. Consequently nqy is the death rate of women
between 20 and 35, i.e. 15q20 = l20−l35
l20 and 15q35 = l35−l50
l35 . We have, for the Agincourt data set 15q20 ' 0.04
and 15q35 ' 0.1.U s i n g ,a sb e f o r ef =1 .4 we ﬁnd that the “expected” within household change eﬀect for a
stable population over the ten years 1993 to 2003 is 0.092, the replacement eﬀect is −0.032 and the dilution
eﬀect is −0.0595. If these numbers are compared to the calculated magnitudes in Table 4, we again see large
discrepancies. As before these are due to the fact that we have not had a stable population and, of course,
the dynamics of that population are more complex than captured in this simple model.
5.3.4 Changes in the mortality rate
We can use the results above to reﬂect on what we might see if there was an increase in the death rates. It
seems clear that an increase in the mortality of adult women will lead to an increase in the average household
size - provided that the orphaned children do not set up independent households. The mechanisms through
which household sizes increase are evident from ﬁgure 5: the households that absorb the orphans are larger;
and the disappearance of some of the small “old” households will raise the average. The process of adjusting to
such a new level will occur through an increase in the “within household” eﬀect which in the new equilibrium
will be oﬀset by higher replacement and dilution eﬀects.
5.3.5 Other household structures
The conclusions that are reached by the numerical decomposition depend on the prevailing household struc-
tures. A very diﬀerent system to that considered thus far is the system of extended families. A diagrammatic
version is presented in Figure 6, which has been constructed so that the underlying population dynamics are
identical to those in Figure 5, panel (a). In this system there is no within household change. Indeed in the
stable population all of the eﬀects are zero!
This example is deliberately extreme, in the sense that households form with their full complement of
members and keep them until the household dissolves. This means that if there are changes, then the
11most interesting action will be on the household formation/dissolution margin. This is a much less realistic
assumption than the one that we started oﬀ with.
As long as households are such that they change shape over their life-span: acquiring members and then
shedding some of them, many of the qualitative results derived earlier should continue to hold. The within
household change eﬀect will tend to be positive as long as the population is growing. The replacement eﬀect
will be inﬂuenced heavily by the dissolution of larger households due to the death or outmigration of the
head of the household. The growth eﬀect will tend to be negative, since new households will tend to be
smaller than the established, surviving ones. So although our model is highly stylised we feel that it is useful
in pointing to the sort of channels through which demographic processes might impact on average household
size.
5.4 How far do purely demographic accounts take us?
Our data thus far show that there has been a steady decline in the average size of households over the period
1993 to 2003. Part of the way in which this decline manifests itself is a reduction in the importance of
households with ten or more members and an increase in the signiﬁcance of households with ﬁve or fewer
members.
We see less intra-household change than we might have expected on purely demographic grounds. Instead
we see much more change on the household formation/dissolution front (the “replacement” eﬀect) and on
the “dilution” front. The measured size of these eﬀects given in Table 4 suggests that there is a process of
restructuring of households underway which goes beyond that necessary to accommodate a smaller fertility
r a t e . W eh a v es o m ed i ﬃculty in pinning down how much of this restructuring is prompted by the AIDS
pandemic, since we cannot follow individuals out of one household and into a new one. Nevertheless according
to the logic sketched out above, the dissolution of households should actually increase average household size
rather than reduce it.
Given the fact that purely demographic explanations do not seem to take us very far in explaining the
reduction in household size, we now turn to examine some of the other types of explanations.
6E c o n o m i c e x p l a n a t i o n s
The standard economic theories referred to earlier would suggest that household size is a function of the
strength of the preferences for privacy; the cost of living separately; and the economies achievable by living
together. If the preferences for privacy are fairly similar across all people then we would expect poorer
households to be bigger, simply due to the cost savings that might be achieved. Similarly we would expect in
periods of economic hardship household sizes to increase. Indeed, as noted in the introduction, it is generally
assumed that the 1990s were a diﬃcult period for the rural areas, such as our study site. Unfortunately we
do not have economic information on our households except for a labour market snapshot that was taken
in the year 2000. This module (added to the annual census round) shows high levels of unemployment,
particularly in the resident rural population (Collinson and Wittenberg 2001).
6.1 Reduction in costs: the case of the RDP village
If some economic factors might be thought to drive in the direction of increasing household size, the cost
factors seem to be pushing strongly in the opposite direction. An extreme case is the RDP village, where
houses were essentially allocated for free through a list system, i.e. a form of rationing. This village is
a settlement of formal cement-brick houses built with money from the government’s Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP). We can get some idea of what sort of individuals have taken possession of
these houses by looking at the age structure revealed in Figure 7. It is clear that the houses are occupied
by younger children (up to age 12) and adults in their twenties and early thirties. The age pyramid might
suggest a settlement of mainly “nuclear” households, but the situation is more complex as is shown in Table
5. This table gives a crude classiﬁcation of household types for the years 1999 to 2002. 1999 is the year in
which residents ﬁrst took possession of the RDP houses and by 2002 the RDP village was fully settled.
12It is evident that compared to newly formed households in other parts of the study site and compared to
existing households, there were many more single person households in the RDP houses. Indeed this is true
in every one of the years in the table. Furthermore the proportion of “nuclear” households is lower among
the newly formed households in the RDP village than it is among newly formed households in the rest of
the study site.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some of these “households” might really be seen as subsidiaries of
bigger households existing elsewhere in the site. Some families seemed to be putting some of their younger
members into the RDP houses as a way of establishing title to an asset that the government was providing
free of charge. This raises all the questions about the nature of households introduced above (Russell 2003a).
At one extreme one might therefore suppose that these are all “sham” entities, i.e. that within the family
there may have been a change in living arrangements, but no substantive change in the social relationships.
At the other extreme one could suppose that the external opportunity provided by the government has
released some pent-up demand for privacy, which has led to the ﬁssioning of some existing households. The
truth is likely to be somewhere between: with some of these “households” more on the independent part
of the continuum and others more on the subsidiary one. Undoubtedly there will also be many households
somewhere in between, i.e. where the change in living arrangements does imply a reconstitution of existing
social relationships, without these necessarily being severed, however. Indeed, it is interesting to note that
many of the single person households that were established in 1999 must have been joined by partners by
2000 (they were the “existing” households in that year). So although the RDP village is special, it probably
exempliﬁes some of the processes occurring elsewhere.
Indeed there have been other innovations in the local housing market. Collinson, Garenne, Tollman,
Kahn and Mokoena (2000), for instance, document the movement of individuals to the adjoining area of
Mkuhlu. This shift was enabled by the breakdown of the “traditional” controls on the development of land.
G i v e nt h a tM k h u h l uh a db e t t e ra c c e s st oe m p l o y m e n t ,t h i sl e dt os i g n i ﬁcant local migration. Even within
the Agincourt site the power to allocate land has shifted away from the chiefs and headmen to development
committees. One of the constraints on new household formation has thereby become loosened.
6.2 Getting access to services
There also appear to have been signiﬁcant local shifts in population. In Table 6 we provide information
on the evolution of four settlement/household types within the Agincourt district. We distinguish between
three kinds of villages: the RDP village, the “refugee” villages and the “South African villages”. Within the
last settlement type we distinguish between “South African” and “Mozambican” households.
We have commented brieﬂy on the construction of the RDP village already. The refugee villages date
back to the 1980s, when they were created to house refugees from the Mozambican civil war. They are all
l o c a t e do nt h ef r i n g e so ft h es t u d ya r e a ,f u r t h e s tr e m o v e d from infrastructure and from economic activities.
Not coincidentally they are also located on the border of the Kruger National Park. Indeed most of the
refugees came through that park from Mozambique. The “South African villages” go back to the 1950s and
1960s when the villages were laid out in terms of “betterment schemes”. Within this category we distinguish
between households headed by a South African citizen3 and households headed by a non-South African
(mainly Mozambican). The latter would be mainly ex-refugees that have managed to resettle themselves in
more central locations.
Budlender (2003) has suggested that it can be completely misleading to classify households on the basis of
the characteristics of a person described as the “head”. Such classiﬁcations can hide some of the complexities
in the nature of the underlying relationships. Indeed these relationships can be quite ﬂuid. Even in our
data set there are a few cases where the citizenship of the head changes4. We would argue that such a
crude categorisation nevertheless captures a signiﬁcant dimension of local reality. Residents of the area do
distinguish between South Africans and the refugees and most households can fairly readily be assigned to
one or the other category.
3There are a few records where we cannot determine the citizenship of the head of the household. These cases have been
pooled with the “South African” households.
4This happens in 218 households out of a total of 15 856. In most cases, however, the change was from “undeﬁned” to
something speciﬁco rvice versa. In order to maintain a consistent classiﬁcation we simply ignored the changes and kept the
original designation of the household.
13The most startling implication to ﬂow from Table 6 is that there seems to have been a gradual transfer
of households from the refugee villages to the South African ones. We cannot draw this conclusion with
certainty, since we cannot track people in our database from one location to another. Nevertheless the
aggregate numbers are highly suggestive. While the refugee villages have lost 235 households between 1992
and 2003, there has been a net gain of 562 “Mozambican” households in the South African villages. Looking
at the year by year ﬁgures is even more suggestive. In the year 1992 to 1993 there was a loss of 104 households
from the refugee villages while there were 115 new Mozambican households in South African villages. In
1993-1994 the ﬁgures were 149 and 145 respectively and in 1994-95 they were 147 and 162.
The reduction in size of the refugee villages can most readily be explained in terms of onward migration
to destinations that have better access to services and jobs. Some of the exodus would undoubtedly have
been to Gauteng and other areas where job opportunities are concentrated. A move to one of the “South
African” villages might, however, also be part of a household strategy to improve access to services. Indeed
Cross and Harwin (2000) have argued that there is extensive migration within South Africa’s rural areas
and that much of this can be explained in terms of improving access to publicly provided infrastructure.
The migration to Mkhuhlu referrred to above (Collinson et al. 2000) is another example of this strategy.
6.3 Exploring the changes further
In order to provide some additional insight, we have decomposed the observed change in household size
within each of the four household types. These decompositions are given in the middle of Table 7. Several
points stand out:
• The South African households within the South African villages seem to have been actively shedding
members over this period. Roughly one third of the reduction in household size within this group
(from 6.36 to 5.9, as shown in Table 6) is due to surviving households actually becoming smaller. The
remainder of the eﬀect is due to dilution - the very rapid formation of smaller households within this
category.
• The Mozambican households within the South African villages, by contrast, seem to have been ab-
sorbing members. The aggregate change of 0.5 over this period is larger than our demographic models
would have predicted. This process is, however, oﬀset by a very strong dilution eﬀect so that the
average household size among the Mozambicans in the South African villages has also come down.
• The Refugee villages show a strong negative “replacement eﬀect”. This shows that the newly formed
households are signiﬁcantly smaller than the dissolving ones. Indeed, the second row of Table 7 shows
that the diﬀerence in size between newly formed and dissolving households is largest in the refugee
villages. This suggests that the dissolving households in these settlements are relatively larger in size.
The positive “dilution” eﬀect is due to the fact that these settlements are not growing - they are
shrinking, i.e. θ − φ is negative.
• The RDP village shows a massive replacement eﬀect. This is mainly due to the fact that in 1999 the
newly formed households (i.e. all households in that village) had an average household size of 2.73
(see Table 6), while the previous household size was zero! The once-oﬀ change due to the formation of
the village accounts for almost all of the replacement eﬀect. More interesting is the positive “within”
household change eﬀect. This suggests that many of the initially small households acquired additional
members. Indeed, as we noted earlier many of the one-person households seem to have been joined by
partners or children.
The most important insight to be gained from these is that there is considerable diversity within the
study site. Larger households within the refugee settlements are dissolving. There is the rapid formation of
smaller households within the South African villages and within the RDP village. South African households
within the South African villages are shedding members, while Mozambican households within these villages
and households in the RDP village are absorbing members.
This picture is complicated yet further when we note the considerable ﬂux that is evident in the household
formation and dissolution rates shown in Table 6. Indeed some of the turnover rates, particularly in the
refugee villages and the RDP village, are truly astonishing.
14In order to organise this information yet further we have apportioned parts of the decomposition of the
change in household size given in Table 4 to each of the household types. In order to make this more precise,
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where wC
i,t is the weight of household type i within category C (i.e. surviving, terminating, newly formed
households) and yC
i,t is the mean household size of household type i in category C . We can therefore
apportion each of the eﬀects as follows:



























The lowest panel in Table 7 reports the aggregate contributions of each of the household types to these
three eﬀects. The results are surprisingly clear cut:
• The overall dilution eﬀect is almost entirely due to the rapid creation of small households by South
A f r i c a nc i t i z e n si nS o u t hA f r i c a nv i l l a g e s
• The negative replacement eﬀect is completely due to the dissolution of large households in the refugee
villages.
• The lack of a within household change eﬀect is due to oﬀsetting eﬀects within South African and
Mozambican households within the South African villages. The former were shedding individuals
while the latter were absorbing new members.
6.4 Assessing the economic explanations
The broad trends summarised above can all be ﬁtted into a set of economic explanations in which access
to land, services and jobs feature prominently. Within the class of these accounts there are two broad
competing explanations. It is clear that apartheid artiﬁcially reduced the supply of land and services to the
majority of the population. It is therefore possible that the rapid rate of household formation is simply due
to the release of this pent-up demand. On the other hand, it is possible that certain new policy initiatives
of the new government (such as the RDP housing schemes) may have themselves stimulated demand. Our
information suggests that both of these may be true. The fact that the rapid rate of household formation
predated the creation of the RDP village suggests that there were independent processes leading to the
reduction of household size. The creation of the RDP village certainly helped this process along. It seems
clear that some of the “household formation” processes around the RDP village were fairly distinctive. On
the other hand, a comparison (in Table 5) between the newly formed households within the South African
villages and those in the RDP housing scheme suggests that the processes were part of the same continuum.
The economic accounts draw attentiont to the fact that changes in the cost of resources are likely to also
change behaviour. We would expect households to act in ways to take advantage of the opportunities that
opened up to them with the political, social and economic changes that occurred since 1994. Changes in
living arrangements and hence household size follow as a consequence.
What the economic accounts are less successful in explaining is why the household formation rate has
persisted at such a high level for such a long time period. Episodes such as the formation of the RDP village
15should have led to a discrete shift in the formation rate, with a return to “equilibrium” levels thereafter.
Similarly the change in the controls on land should have had a pronounced impact around 1993/94 and then
settled back thereafter.
Looking at the patterns in the household formation rates in Figure 2 one can reconcile the economic
accounts to some extent with the data. It is particularly interesting to note that the new household formation
rate peaks in 2000, around the time that the RDP village was being occupied (as indicated in the bottom-
most panel). Furthermore the net household formation rate drops markedly at the end, which might suggest
that the “pent-up demand” has ﬁnally run out of steam. On the other hand, one does not want to place too
much stock on the last two periods, since these are more likely to be subject to data errors.
Nevertheless the length of this household formation boom suggests that there may be deeper social
changes occurring.
7 Sociological explanations
It is possible that there may have been changes in the preferences for collective living. An extreme form
of such preferences is solitary living. Pirouz (2004, p.1 and Table 6) documents a startling increase in the
numbers of single person households in the national cross-sectional surveys from 1995 to 2002—as h i f tf r o m
12.6% to 21% of all households. In our study site we do not ﬁnd such a stark change — the prevalence
of single person households increases from 7.7% to 8.8% in the period 1992 to 2003. Nevertheless as our
discussion of the “structure eﬀect” revealed, there is a deﬁnite trend away from the largest households.
More generally, there is a debate among sociologists whether African families are becoming more “nuclear”
(Ziehl 2001, Russell 2003b, Russell 2003a). The patterns of household formation and dissolution discussed
above would certainly suggest that couples or other “minimal household units” (Ermisch and Overton 1985)
are leaving larger households and setting up independently.
These patterns cannot reveal, however, whether these changes in living arrangements reﬂect real changes
in the underlying social relationships. As Russell has argued, people are embedded in long-lasting social
relationships. Taking a snapshot across these relationships is not guaranteed to reveal the full set of connec-
tions. People may be part of an extended family system, even though they spend many years of their life in
what looks like a “nuclear” household.
These objections undoubtedly have considerable validity. It is possible that we are observing a moment
in which households are reshaping themselves. For instance, it is possible that the “refugee” households are
sending out small “scout parties” that try to establish themselves in new locations and that larger households
may reconstitute themselves around them in due course. Indeed the strong “within household change eﬀect”
among Mozambican households in South African villages might hint at such a process. Nevertheless it is
also possible to overplay this sort of objection. What makes our study site interesting is precisely that it
allows us to track households over several years. Furthermore it is at the “rural” end of the continuum.
Russell’s objection makes most sense in the context of urban migrants that are analysed without taking due
cognisance of their rural social relationships5. Our data set includes the urban migrants provided that they
are still identiﬁed as household members by the rural household.
Furthermore there are good grounds for believing that rural households may have been under considerable
internal social strain. In the late 1980s the Bushbuckridge area saw considerable political conﬂict which took
the form inter alia of generational conﬂict (Niehaus 2001). The “youth” of the area was seen as rejecting
many of the “traditional” values of their elders. Given this background one might have expected some
changes in the living arrangements.
Indeed, the fact that households are becoming smaller across the country and across diﬀerent subpopu-
lations in our study site suggests that something “real” is occurring, something that cannot be dismissed as
a temporary blip. What is remarkable is that we can identify many countervailing forces: the rapid escala-
tion in the size of the pension payments during the early 1990s should have increased the attractiveness of
collecive living; the increase in unemployment should have done likewise. The fact that household size has
still come down so sharply suggests that the pressures leading to new household formation and the ﬁssioning
of existing households must be tremendous.
5Even in that context successive cross-sections should capture individuals at all stages of this process.
168C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have tried to explore the observed reduction of household size within the Agincourt area.
To this end we have developed a new decomposition technique and have contrasted our empirical ﬁndings
with this technique with what a simple demographic model might lead us to predict. Our ﬁndings suggest
that the changes extend beyond what changes in fertility and mortality would mandate — although those
changes have been dramatic in their own right.
We have shown that there seem to be at least three distinct processes occurring:
• Mozambican households seem to be moving out of the refugee villages and into the South African
villages. In the process households seem to be getting smaller.
• South African households are shedding some members. This is probably linked to the strong rate of
new household formation in the South African villages.
• Associated with the RDP housing scheme there seems to have been some “excess” new household
formation.
The sustained household formation “boom” from 1994 to 2000 suggests that both changes in the cost
of land and housing (most dramatically in the case of the RDP housing schemes) as well as more deep-
seated attitudinal changes are at work. The preliminary evidence suggests that this boom may be coming
to an end. A more deﬁnitive analysis would require additional data such as more targeted socio-economic
information, attitudinal information and more ethnographic work. An improved ability to track individuals
and households within the study site would also throw more light on the extent to which internal migration
towards areas of better infrastructure is occurring.
More generally our study highlights some of the mechanisms by which South Africa’s household size
has been reduced. Apartheid was a system that was based on extensive settlement controls. The end of
apartheid removed these. Furthermore the new government aggressively expanded access to housing and
services. These processes by themselves would have led to new household formation. The changes in social
norms associated with the end of apartheid are likely to have accentuated these processes.
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19Figure 1: The Agincourt ﬁeld site covers 21 villages in the Bushbuckridge area































































Figure 2: Aggregate Population and Household dynamics in Agincourt
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Figure 3: Age pyramids for South African citizens and non-South African citizens (mainly Mozambican
refugees) in the study site, 1993 and 2003.
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Figure 4: Percentage change in the number of individuals within a given age cohort between 1993 and 2003,
by subpopulation
23FY
FM  C  C
FO FY FY
FY
FM  C  C
FM  C  C FM  C  C FO FY FY
FO FY FY FO FY FY FM  C  C FM  C  C
Nuclear households
FY
FM  C  C
FO FY FY
FY
FM  C  C
FM  C  C     C  C FY FY
FO FY FY FY FY FM  C  C FM  C  C
a) With mortality only in old age
b) With mortality at younger ages
Figure 5: A simple overlapping generations model of household change. Panel a) The basic model. Individ-
uals change from children C to young adults FY , to mature adults FM and ﬁnally to old ones FO. Earlier
periods are below later ones. Households are enclosed in solid lines. Panel b) Households that dissolve due
to the death of the head are indicated by dashed boxes. Orphaned children are fostered by other households.
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Figure 6: The same underlying population dynamics as those in Figure 5, but embedded in a diﬀerent house-
hold structure would give a diﬀerent decomposition into “within household”, “replacement” and “growth”
eﬀects. In this case they are all zero.
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Figure 7: Age pyramid of the RDP village
25Table 1: Average household size in South Africa 1995 - 2004
OHS 1995 OHS 1999 LFS March 2004 Change 95-04
Urban 3.98 3.60 3.30 0.68
Rural 4.92 4.68 4.14 0.77
Overall 4.37 4.03 3.63 0.74
Source: Own calculations from Statistics South Africa data sets. Estimates are weighted 
using the Statistics SA supplied household weights.Table 2: Time evolution of the "demographic effect" in Agincourt and Europe
Europe 1960s 1970s
1992-2003 47.4 Sweden 43 19
1993 167.4 Denmark 48 28
1994 14.0 Finland 21 21
1995 78.6 France 60 33
1996 32.3 Norway 45 34
1997 48.3 Netherland 50 38
1998 7.0 United King 44 8
1999 70.8 Austria 53 13
2000 33.5 Belgium 73 19
2001 1.3 FRG 77 22
2002 -27.3 Italy 44 29
2003 119.4 Greece 29 49
Source: 
Agincourt: own calculations. Europe: Kuijsten and Oskamp (1991) cited in Kuijsten (1995) p.69
AgincourtTable 3: Evolution of the "structure effect" in Agincourt
household size 123456789 1 0   and greater
1992-2003 12.5 6.8 16.0 15.4 11.3 1.0 -5.3 1.7 -0.4 -12.4
1993 27.2 -9.6 -33.3 -21.6 6.8 -47.8 -35.4 -11.5 37.3 20.6
1994 31.2 28.5 -5.7 11.4 40.7 -11.4 7.8 -29.0 15.8 -3.3
1995 -10.4 -14.0 30.2 10.8 16.3 5.8 -7.6 16.3 -13.6 -12.4
1996 51.1 1.6 8.0 8.9 -0.8 23.8 8.1 -17.1 12.1 -28.1
1997 10.0 10.0 20.0 25.1 2.5 -12.2 12.1 2.9 -3.8 -15.0
1998 35.3 15.6 5.2 26.1 19.8 19.9 -21.0 13.9 7.0 -28.9
1999 -10.4 2.6 15.1 22.2 14.8 10.3 -21.5 19.2 -12.5 -10.6
2000 -14.2 14.3 83.9 8.7 -23.5 7.4 26.9 -12.0 -24.4 -0.6
2001 -0.1 12.8 46.5 36.7 20.7 12.7 34.8 -20.4 -16.6 -28.4
2002 -27.0 31.4 -150.2 185.6 9.1 232.4 108.5 -186.0 78.1 -154.6








1993-94 -0.097 -0.015 -0.982 -2.784 -0.014 -0.038 -0.046
1994-95 -0.026 0.043 -0.689 -2.438 0.041 -0.024 -0.043
1995-96 -0.055 -0.014 -0.32 -2.563 -0.014 -0.010 -0.031
1996-97 -0.086 0.02 -0.907 -2.924 0.019 -0.030 -0.075
1997-98 -0.126 -0.026 -1.3 -2.834 -0.025 -0.043 -0.058
1998-99 -0.064 0.046 -0.535 -3.029 0.044 -0.016 -0.092
1999-00 -0.052 0.008 -0.5 -2.741 0.008 -0.027 -0.033
2000-01 -0.085 -0.036 -0.34 -2.748 -0.034 -0.013 -0.037
2001-02 -0.011 -0.01 0.052 -2.715 -0.010 0.002 -0.004
2002-03 0.003 0.002 0.264 -2.583 0.002 0.008 -0.007
1993-03 -0.599 0.018 -0.191 -0.424
% change -9.1% -3.0% 31.8% 70.9%
decomposition:
Contribution:Table 5: Household composition by type of household, 1999-2001
New Existing New Existing New Existing New Existing
1999 Single person 0.293 0.073 0.197 0.048 0.094 0.057 0.367
Couple 0.069 0.030 0.039 0.026 0.047 0.026 0.032
Nuclear 0.257 0.224 0.331 0.281 0.344 0.258 0.216
Single parent 0.159 0.083 0.205 0.071 0.250 0.091 0.174
Three generation 0.072 0.223 0.047 0.138 0.109 0.164 0.060
Other 0.149 0.367 0.181 0.436 0.156 0.405 0.151
2000 Single person 0.192 0.070 0.133 0.048 0.132 0.049 0.337 0.246
Couple 0.081 0.026 0.039 0.021 0.044 0.028 0.068 0.048
Nuclear 0.342 0.213 0.414 0.265 0.294 0.236 0.249 0.257
Single parent 0.166 0.077 0.133 0.081 0.250 0.088 0.153 0.187
Three generation 0.062 0.228 0.094 0.145 0.044 0.171 0.068 0.070
Other 0.156 0.385 0.187 0.440 0.235 0.428 0.124 0.193
2001 Single person 0.246 0.068 0.052 0.047 0.105 0.043 0.293 0.218
Couple 0.085 0.026 0.075 0.018 0.013 0.025 0.050 0.072
Nuclear 0.288 0.206 0.358 0.258 0.382 0.247 0.193 0.278
Single parent 0.188 0.077 0.209 0.085 0.145 0.095 0.193 0.165
Three generation 0.073 0.231 0.149 0.156 0.184 0.179 0.071 0.072
Other 0.119 0.392 0.157 0.436 0.171 0.411 0.200 0.196
2002 Single person 0.271 0.069 0.148 0.047 0.158 0.049 0.308 0.173
Couple 0.037 0.027 0.045 0.017 0.053 0.027 0.135 0.058
Nuclear 0.285 0.203 0.295 0.244 0.316 0.243 0.202 0.275
Single parent 0.182 0.078 0.182 0.093 0.211 0.092 0.183 0.180
Three generation 0.070 0.233 0.102 0.166 0.092 0.193 0.048 0.090
Other 0.154 0.391 0.227 0.432 0.171 0.395 0.125 0.225
South Africans in SA 
villages
Mozambicans in S.A. 
villages Refugee villages RDP vilageTable 6: Aggregate changes in Agincourt by type of household
SA Moz Refugee RDP SA Moz Refugee RDP SA Moz Refugee RDP SA Moz Refugee RDP SA Moz Refugee RDP
1992 6.36 7.29 6.68 6,807 1,663 1,354
1993 6.39 7.43 6.73 6,931 1,685 1,328 124 22 -26 225 115 78 101 93 104
1994 6.29 7.41 6.57 7,091 1,741 1,285 160 56 -43 302 145 106 142 89 149
1995 6.24 7.38 6.65 7,242 1,839 1,225 151 98 -60 286 162 87 135 64 147
1996 6.18 7.29 6.68 7,357 1,910 1,169 115 71 -56 258 140 55 143 69 111
1997 6.09 7.16 6.67 7,559 1,993 1,167 202 83 -2 363 170 97 161 87 99
1998 5.99 6.98 6.47 7,702 2,091 1,157 143 98 -10 300 163 119 157 65 129
1999 5.97 7.02 6.55 2.73 7,796 2,137 1,151 218 94 46 -6 218 276 127 64 218 182 81 70
2000 5.96 7.05 6.64 2.81 7,748 2,140 1,122 436 -48 3 -29 218 307 128 68 249 355 125 97 31
2001 5.88 6.96 6.58 2.92 7,785 2,203 1,118 503 37 63 -4 67 260 134 76 140 223 71 80 73
2002 5.88 6.96 6.41 3.01 7,787 2,207 1,128 504 2 4 10 1 214 88 76 104 212 84 66 103
2003 5.90 6.94 6.35 3.10 7,805 2,225 1,119 510 18 18 -9 6 167 69 44 104 149 51 53 98
SA Moz Refugee RDP SA Moz Refugee RDP SA Moz Refugee RDP
1992
1993 1.8% 1.3% -1.9% 3.3% 6.9% 5.8% 1.5% 5.6% 7.7%
1994 2.3% 3.3% -3.2% 4.4% 8.6% 8.0% 2.0% 5.3% 11.2%
1995 2.1% 5.6% -4.7% 4.0% 9.3% 6.8% 1.9% 3.7% 11.4%
1996 1.6% 3.9% -4.6% 3.6% 7.6% 4.5% 2.0% 3.8% 9.1%
1997 2.7% 4.3% -0.2% 4.9% 8.9% 8.3% 2.2% 4.6% 8.5%
1998 1.9% 4.9% -0.9% 4.0% 8.2% 10.2% 2.1% 3.3% 11.1%
1999 1.2% 2.2% -0.5% 3.6% 6.1% 5.5% 2.4% 3.9% 6.1%
2000 -0.6% 0.1% -2.5% 100.0% 3.9% 6.0% 5.9% 114.2% 4.6% 5.8% 8.4% 14.2%
2001 0.5% 2.9% -0.4% 15.4% 3.4% 6.3% 6.8% 32.1% 2.9% 3.3% 7.1% 16.7%
2002 0.0% 0.2% 0.9% 0.2% 2.7% 4.0% 6.8% 20.7% 2.7% 3.8% 5.9% 20.5%
2003 0.2% 0.8% -0.8% 1.2% 2.1% 3.1% 3.9% 20.6% 1.9% 2.3% 4.7% 19.4%
Note: Households have been classified by village type (SA villages, Refugee Villages, RDP village) and citizenship of head of household (SA villages)
change due to exit
terminating households Mean household size Number of households year on year change new households














S -0.016 0.057 0.011 0.122
Average annual y
N-y
T -0.045 -0.596 -0.981 0.150
Average annual y
N-y
S -2.744 -3.012 -2.541 -0.289
Within category
within effect -0.152 0.543 0.094 0.410
replacement effect -0.014 -0.221 -0.880 2.858
dilution effect -0.330 -0.811 0.405 -0.172
Contribution overall
weighted within effect -0.105 0.098 0.013 0.012 0.018
weighted replacement effect 0.007 0.010 -0.285 0.078 -0.190
weighted dilution effect -0.410 -0.043 -0.017 0.046 -0.424
Notes: The averages in the case of the RDP village are calculated for the period 1999-
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